RECENT CASES.
BILLS AND NOTES.
In an action to recover money paid by mistake, it appeared
that the defendant had for several months been accustomed to
cash checks for one R. Four checks drawn on the
For
Che&
plaintiff and apparently signed by R. were cashed
Payable
to
Bearer
by the defendant, who signed his name on the back
Whendorset
without any qualification and presented them to
Liable to
Drawer
the plaintiff for payment. The plaintiff paid the
checks, but it was subsequently discovered that
they were forgeries, and therefore the plaintiff brought suit to
recover the amount paid. Judgment by the lower court for the
defendant.
Held, error, as the defendant should be made to bear the loss.
Williamsburg Trust Co. v. Turn Suder, 12o N. Y. App. Div.
518.
See note appearing elsewhere in this issue.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The legislature of Michigan appropriated five hundred dollars
a year to an association to aid it in prosecuting its work of creating a deeper interest in and a better knowledge of
Wae:
the culture and production of corn. The associaConstitutes a
tion was a voluntary, unincorporated body, the
PublicParpose membership of which was limited to those residents of Michigan actively interested in the improvement of
corn. The money was to be expended in such way as the directors deemed most effectual for attaining the object of the association.
Held, the act was unconstitutional, for the purpose could not
be considered a public one.
Michigan Corn Improvement Association v. Auditor General,
113 N. W. 582.
See note appearing elsewhere in this issue.
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DIVORCE.
A wife sought a divorce on the ground of cruelty. The main
acts of cruelty were proved by the direct testimony of complainSvidence:

ant, corroborated only in collateral details by other
witnesses. Court below granted divorce and husband appealed. Held, affirming the judgment, that

there is no hard and fast rule preventing the granting of a
divorce on complainant's testimony alone, though it is undoubtedly the correct rule that where a divorce is so granted the right
thereto must be very clearly established. Supreme Court of
Michigan in Murphy v. Murphy, 113 N. W. 583.
It is generally stated that a divorce will not be granted on the
testimony of complainant alone. Tate v. Tate, 26 N. J. Eq. 55;
Reid v. Reid, 112 Cal. 274.
Indeed, it has been held that where there is a conflict in the
uncorroborated evidence of the parties, the testimony of defendant is deemed of greater weight; Rie v. Rie, 34 Ark. 37.
On the other hand, a more liberal view is expressed in Robins
v. Robins, ioo Mass. 15o, where it is said that "the rule ....
is merely a general rule of practice and not an inflexible rule
of law."
EVIDENCE.
In a prosecution which resulted in defendant's conviction
for manslaughter, the defendant offered evidence tending to
show that his character as to peaceableness and
Character:
quietness was good, this evidence to be based on
Persoal
the personal knowledge and observation of the
opinion
Witness ofisthe witness. Held, that while the community reputaAdmissible
tion as to particular traits is admissible upon the
question of character, the personal knowledge and
belief of the witness must be excluded; People v. Van Gaasbeek, 189 N. Y. 4o8. Originally, the personal opinion of the
witness was admitted; Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1981. In
course of time the rule was conceived to be that evidence of
general reputation only was admissible, and this has been generally followed; Reg. v. Rowton, Leigh and Cave 52o. The
original view is still adhered to in a few jurisdictions on the
ground that there is no reason why general repute is any better
or more satisfactory evidence of disposition than the testimony
of one who knows ivhat the disposition in question is from his
own personal observatin; State v. Lee, 22 Minn. 407. The
evidence gained by experience is admittedly worth more than
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EVIDENCE (Continued).
that from the reputation a man bears; Wigmore on Evidence,
Sec. 1986. The New York court says if evidence of witness's
personal opinion is admitted, then the incidents on which he
bases his opinion must be admitted, and this would lead to
collateral issues and admit evidence which is practically irrebuttable by the commonwealth. The reasoning of the court is
answered by the practice in those states where the original
doctrine is adhered to; but since what the witness does give is
generally his personal view and it is not objected to, the question of the admissibility of this opinion evidence arises seldom
and is practically unimportant. Note XXV to Stephens' Digest
of Evidence.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Action was brought for injuries sustained by falling into a
hole in one of the city streets. A demurrer was sustained on
Negligence:
Notice of

the ground that no notice in writing within thirty
days of the injury complained of was given as
required by section 39, art. 3, c. 13, Comp. St. 19o7.

The plaintiff sought to avoid the effect of the statute by pleading that she was unconscious during the prescribed
time and was therefore excused from giving the required
notice. This plea was held insufficient; Ellis v. City of Kearney, 113 N. W. 803, Supreme Court of Nebraska. While this
decision accords with the general line of cases, many states
have avoided the evident injustice of the statute in such cases
as this by providing that if any person receiving injuries from
defects in a highway is unavoidably prevented from serving
the required notice within the time prescribed by the statute,
the supreme court may allow such claim to be filed if manifest
injustice would otherwise be done; Chadbornev. Town of Ex-

Injury

eter, 6u N. H. 19o.

NEGLIGENCE.
The plaintiff, an inmate of a workhouse and recipient of poor
law relief, was directed to assist the resident electrician in the
Charity fr
Act

of

Srvants

installation of electric lights. Refusal to obey
would, under the English law, have rendered the

plaintiff liable to imprisonment. A scaffolding on

which the plaintiff had mounted collapsed, thereby

injuring the plaintiff. The accident being due to the negligence
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NEGLIGENCE (Continued).
of the electrician in not having the scaffolding securely constructed, the plaintiff brought suit against the Guardians of the
Poor, whose servant the electrician was.
Held, there could be no recovery.
Tozeland v. Guardiansof the Poor,L. R. (19o7) i K. B. 920.

See note appearing elsewhere in this issue.
The defendant maintained a cellarway to his store at the
corner of two streets. On one side this was unguarded. The
distance
Duty to
waben from the sidewalk to this unguarded side
was two feet, the intervening space being level
Trespasser:
Opening
Highway:near

with the sidewalk.

The plaintiff hurrying to the

railroad station on a dark evening turned the corner sharply and fell into the cellarway. The lower
court left the case to the jury, which found a
verdict for the plaintiff. Held, error; Collins v. Decker, 120
N. Y. App. Div. 645.
The attitude of the court is shown by the following extracts
from the opinion: "There is no difference in principle whether
the stairway be two or twenty feet from the sidewalk. The act
of the plaintiff in leaving the sidewalk may have been natural
and excusable. But he did not take the time or trouble to properly inform himself of the exact boundaries of the streets as indicated by the sidewalk." P. 648. "I am convinced that the test
of liability is whether the excavation adjoins the highway or
is in such close proximity thereto that a person while on the
highway stepping or stumbling, or making a misstep falls into
the excavation, but that such liability does not exist where the
traveller deviates for ever so short a distance and becomes a
trespasser before he falls."
There seems a tendency in some courts to punish even innocent though technical trespassers by debarring them from recovering for negligence. In a Pennsylvania decision, Strong,
J., used the following expression: "There is as perfect a duty
to guard against accidental injury to a night intruder into one's
bed chamber as there is to look out for trespassers upon a railroad ;" Railroad v. Hummel, 44 Pa. 375. It is hard to find a
reasonable ground for such a view. The preferable rule would
seem to make liability depend upon the probability of trespassers coming upon the property and receiving injuries; Am. and
Eng. Encyc., Vol. 21, p. 472; Shearman and Redfield, Negligence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, § 97; Sanders v. Riester, i Dak. 151.
A man will not ordinarily be bound to anticipate wilful tres-

Province
Court andof
Jury
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NEGLIGENCE (Continued).
passers. Sometimes'he ought and is held to be bound to anticipate innocent trespassers. The liability imposed on one who
causes injury to trespassing infants by allowing attractive
dangers to be within their reach, though on his own property, is
an instance of this. If this be the correct view a court should
not take a case from the jury unless no reasonable differences
of opinion could be entertained as to the probability of trespass
and injury.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.
When, after notice of an unauthorized sale of a contract for
the future delivery of cotton by his broker, the customer determines upon his line of conduct by immediately
Unauthorized notifying his broker that he will hold him legally
Sale by
responsible, he canont measure his damages by the
Stockholder:
Measure
of
Damages
highest market price obtained by similar contracts
within a period of two weeks after the unauthorized sale; this because he cannot speculate at the expense of
his broker, but is only entitled to the highest market price attained within the reasonable time necessary to enable him to
determine upon his line of action; Hurt v. Miller, 120 N. Y.
App. Div. 833, McLaughlin and Clarke, JJ., dissenting in part.
In actions for the conversion of stocks, etc., the weight of
authority seems to support the rule allowing the recovery of the
highest value of such stock from the time of the conversion up
to a reasonable time after knowledge of such conversion. Cases
are not lacking, however, which hold the measure of damages
to be the value of the stock at the time of the conversion;
Freeman v. Harwood, 49 Me. 195. Some of the states, on the
other hand, have adhered to the original rule of highest intermediate value between the conversion and the trial; Learoch v.
Paxson, 208 Pa. 602 (I9O4), Thompson, J. "While it is true
that in the conversion of ordinary chattels the measure of damages is the value at the time of the conversion, yet, in view of
the shifting character of the price of stock in our stock exchanges such a rule would be manifestly inadequate. It has,
therefore, been held that stocks are an exception to the rule
in question and the highest price in the market is consequently
made the measure of damages." Some states have enacted
statutes allowing the recovery of the highest market value of
the property at any time between the conversion and the trial;
Cal. Civil Code, par. 3336. But under all such statutes the
action must be prosecuted with reasonable diligence.
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SALES.

-

Defendant sold a traction engine to the plaintiff in consideration of $4oo and an old horse power. Ten days' trial was
allowed. After testing the engine on six or seven
different days the plaintiff sent word to the defendOn Approval
or Trial:
accept.
ant of his absolute determination not to next
Acts
Constituting
he
During the rest of that day and half the
ElcUon
used the engine in order to finish a job of threshing on which he was then engaged. When he demanded from
the defendant the old horse power of which the defendant had
obtained possession, the latter, denying the plaintiff's right to
rescind, refused to return it. In an action of replevin to
recover the old horse power the jury found for the plaintiff,
but in answer to two questions from the court, found: (i)
That plaintiff had absolutely determined to reject the machine;
(2) that after so determining he proceeded to use it for the
purpose of finishing the threshing job on which he was engaged.
The court entered judgment for the defendant. Held, judgment affirmed, for the use of the machine after determination
to reject constituted acceptance; Fox v. Wilkinson, 113 No.
West, 669 (Wis.).
Acceptance, since it depends on intention, is a question of
fact for the jury unless the evidence is such that reasonable
men could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn therefrom. Where goods are delivered on trial use of them in
excess of what is necessary for trial, either with respect to time
or amount, will usually be held conclusive evidence of exceptance in the absence of evidence to the contrary; Benjamin on
Sales, 5th Ed., p. 1013; Pahnerv. Baufield, 86 Wis. 441.

But

it is not necessarily so. The use of a horse beyond the time
agreed on for trial was held not to be conclusive so as to take
the case from the jury; Kahn v. Klabund, 50 Wis. 235.
Where there is a question whether the use was necessary for
trial or not, the case should go to the jury; Okell v. Smith, 2
E. C. L. 49. The right of the buyer to use the goods after
showing a determination to reject is clearly a distinct question
from the effect of such unnecessary use in evidence of intent
to accept. If there is evidence clearly negativing such intent,
then in spite of such unnecessary use the question should be
submitted to the jury; Schwarz v. Church, 6o Minn. 183. The
principal case therefore seems extreme.
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Purchaser agreed to take certain "Bassein Rice" according
to sample, and sold the invoice at an advance. After the purchaser found that the sample was not "Bassein"
veaor's
rice, but "Java" rice, a much more valuable kind,
Mistake
Known to
he ordered more, leaving the vendor under the
Vendee
impression that his sample was of "Bassein" rice.
Held, in a suit by purchaser against the vendor for nondelivery, that the purchaser might recover for the failure to
deliver the rice sold under mutual mistake, but no recovery
could be had for that sold where the mistake was that of the
vendor alone, and known only to the purchaser; Davis v. Reisinger, 12 N. Y. App. Div. 767. Where one accepts an offer
in which he knows the offerer errs as to the nature or extent
of his promise, equity will compel him to elect to cancel the
contract, or perform it rectified to suit the offerer's real intention; Gerrardv. Frankel, 30 Beav. 445. There need not be any
misleading by express words, Blackburn, J., in Lee v. Jones,
17 C. B. N. S. 482; but at what point communication of the
fact known to one party only is required, and what may be
concealed is the question on which the authorities differ. Brainwell, B. in Lee v. Jones, 17 C. B. N. S.482. Here, however, as
the purchaser knew not only the fact concealed to the vendor,
but also that the vendor was contracting on the supposition of
the non-existence of that fact, the case was correctly decided;

Smith v. Hughes, L. R. 6 Q. B. 597.

TORTS.
A entered a railroad station to send a telegram from the
telegraph company's office in the station. The agent in charge
of the office ordered A to leave, insulted her and
humiliated her by abusive language. Held, that
Mental
eerahi
Suffering as a sic. h
since the telegraph company isa public service
Cause of
Action:
corporation, ithas a duty to afford decent treatTelegraph Co.:
Insult
ment to persons wishing to employ the company.
That there had been a breach of this duty, and as
a result A had suffered the injury of humiliation and wounded
feelings and had a cause of action against the company. Court
of Appeal, of Georgia, in Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
59 S.E. 189.
There is one class of cases in which mental suffering without
any other injury has given rise to an action, namely, those cases
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where mental anguish has resulted from the negligence of telegraph companies in misstating messages announcing sickness
or death of a near relative; Chapman v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 90 Ky. 265; Mentzer v. Tel. Co., 93 Iowa, 752.

But this rule is against the great weight of authority (Cooley
Torts, 3d Ed., p. 92, and cases cited), and is rejected in Georgia
in Chapman v. Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763.
It has been pointed out (Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64)
that the law takes cognizance of mental suffering in two classes
of cases: (i) Where it is the result of some physical injury;
(2) in such cases as malicious prosecution and libel. In both
these classes of cases there is, however, a cause of action aside
from the mental suffering. Here there is no injury aside from
the mental suffering.
It seems, therefore, that the decision must rest on the ground
that a telegraph company as a public service corporation owes
extraordinary duties to the public in the course of its business.

